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IN THE NAME OF EFFICIENCY: HOW THE 
MASSACHUSETTS DISTRICT COURTS ARE 
LOBBYING AWAY THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 
Raisa Litmanovich*
Abstract: This Note explores the current practice of lobby conferences in 
Massachusetts district courts. At these proceedings, attorneys meet with 
the judge in chambers, without the defendant and off the record. The at-
torneys and the judge make one last attempt to settle the case before pro-
ceeding to trial. Court officials rely on the lack of record in lobby confer-
ences to foster the type of candid discussion between the attorneys and 
the judge they believe to be necessary for efficient disposition of cases. As 
this Note examines the reasons why lobby conferences have a unique role 
in district courts, it also highlights how the lack of record makes it nearly 
impossible for indigent criminal defendants to hold their attorneys ac-
countable for anything that happens at these proceedings. This Note ar-
gues that mandating recording of lobby conferences will be circumvented 
by the courts. Instead, appellate courts must recognize the inherent con-
flict of interest and change how they treat ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims that arise in the context of lobby conferences. 
Introduction 
Because criminal law governs the most serious sanctions that a society can im-
pose on its members, inequity in its administration has especially corrosive con-
sequences. Perceptions of race and class disparities in the criminal justice system 
are at the core of the race and class division in our society. . . . [and have been 
exploited] to make the hard choices of the criminal justice system easier. 1
 
 As incarceration rates rapidly stretch the criminal justice system to 
capacity, the state of indigent defense in Massachusetts has reached a 
                                                                                                                      
* Comment Editor, Boston College Third World Journal (2008–2009). 
1 David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Jus-
tice System 11–12 (1999). 
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crisis point.2 The state-funded Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS) coordinates representation of indigent defendants in Massa-
chusetts.3 However, CPCS’s staff of 110 full-time attorneys has been far 
from sufficient to meet the needs of indigent defendants across the 
state.4 Court appointed private counsel make up more than ninety per-
cent of criminal and civil representation in Massachusetts.5 Neverthe-
less, Massachusetts has been consistently reluctant to fund indigent de-
fense to its full capacity.6
 In the summer of 2004, indigent defense gained state-wide atten-
tion when lawyers refused to take additional cases in a protest over in-
adequate pay, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered 
the release of prisoners who were held without counsel.7 The crisis of 
                                                                                                                      
 
2 See Pew Ctr. on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, at 5 
(2008); Jason M. Scally, All Quiet on the Western Front?, Mass. Law. Wkly., Aug. 22, 2005, at 
24. According to the Pew Report, the American prison population has tripled over the last 
twenty years, and today it is higher than any other country in the world. See Pew Ctr. on 
the States, supra, at 5. 
 For the first time in history more than one in every 100 adults in America 
are in jail or prison. . . . 
 . . . . 
 A close examination of the most recent U.S. Department of Justice data 
(2006) found that while one in 30 men between the ages of 20 and 34 is be-
hind bars, the figure is one in nine for black males in that age group. 
Press Release, Pew Ctr. on the States, Pew Report Finds More than One in 100 Adults Are 
Behind Bars (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/news_room_ 
detail.aspx?id=35912. Massachusetts’s prison population has grown by three percent in the 
last two years, making it the highest in the Northeast. See Pew Ctr. on the States, supra, 
app. 29. For every dollar that Massachusetts spent on higher education, it spent ninety eight 
cents on corrections. See id. app. 31. This represents a huge burden not only on the courts’ 
resources but also on the state. See id. 
3 Spangenberg Group, Indigent Defense in Massachusetts: A Case History of 
Reform 1 (2005). 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Super. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895, 912 (Mass. 2004); 
Scally, supra note 2, at 24. On May 3 and 4, 2004, no private attorneys showed up in Hamp-
den County District Court to take on new cases, and at least nineteen indigent defendants 
were arraigned without counsel. See Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d. at 901. On July 8, 2004, the situa-
tion did not get any better, when “fifty-eight indigent defendants with cases pending in 
Hampden County were without counsel to represent them; thirty-one were held in cus-
tody.” See id. at 912 n.10. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that the de-
fendants were being deprived their right to counsel under Article 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. See id. at 901. The SJC ordered the release of prisoners in Hampden 
County who were being held for more than seven days without counsel and a dismissal of 
all the charges if an attorney was not appointed within 45 days. See id. at 912. Hampden, 
however, was not the only county encountering problems recruiting attorneys to represent 
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representation of indigent defendants was due, in part, to Massachu-
setts’s failure to increase the pay scale for appointed counsel since 
1986.8 In addition, some defense counsel faced a long lag time before 
payment.9 For example, some waited eight months for services ren-
dered in the previous fiscal year.10 As the shortage of qualified attorneys 
to represent indigent defendants continues, the number of court filings 
has increased annually.11 In the 2008 fiscal year, 828,637 cases were 
filed in Massachusetts District Court alone—an increase of 5.7% from 
the year before.12 Each year CPCS assigns about 200,000 new criminal 
and civil cases for representation.13
 The large caseload and shortage of counsel creates an incentive 
for the system to resolve cases as quickly as possible.14 As a result, plea 
bargaining has become “a way of life.”15 In Massachusetts’s three largest 
counties, about eighty percent of criminal cases are settled without a 
trial.16 Even though plea bargaining plays a dominant role in the dispo-
sition of criminal cases, it is “an area [of the law] with minimal court 
                                                                                                                      
indigent defendants; both Superior and District Courts in Suffolk and Middlesex counties 
were having similar problems. See Kathleen Burge, Public Defenders Protest Pay Lack: Vote to 
Refuse New Court Cases, Boston Globe, Aug. 16, 2003, at B4; Scally, supra note 2, at 24. 
8 See Spangenberg Group, supra note 3, at 1. Even though the state legislature ap-
proved a $7.50 pay increase just days after the Hampden incident, the pay for appointed 
counsel in Massachusetts still remains one of the lowest in the country. See id. at 5. 
9 Buffy Spencer, Some Lawyers Awaiting State Pay, The Republican (Springfield, Mass.), 
Aug. 4, 2007, at A01, available at 2007 WLNR 15200055. 
10 See id. 
11 Mass. Dist. Court Dep’t, Summary of Filings—Fiscal Years 1997 through 2008, avail-
able at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/allstats2008.pdf 
(compiling the number of Massachusetts District Court filings from fiscal year 1996 
through 2006). The number of filings does not necessarily correlate to the number of 
indigent defendants passing through the system. See id. However, it does indicate the in-
creasing stress on the court’s resources. See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Spangenberg Group, supra note 3, at 1. 
14 See Earnest B. Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Judge: Plan for Lobby Conferences Should Be 
Debated, Mass. Law. Wkly., May 28, 2007, at 54. 
15 See Gary V. Murray, Plea Deals Keep Courts Functioning, Worcester Telegram & Ga-
zette, Feb. 25, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 11481277. Plea bargaining is a process 
by which “[t]he defendant voluntarily admits responsibility for the crime by entering a 
guilty plea, and, in turn, the prosecution agrees to [recommend to the judge] to reduce 
the number or severity of criminal charges pursued against the defendant or, alternatively, 
recommends that the judge impose a less-than-maximum sentence.” Christopher E. Smith, 
Plea Bargaining, in The U.S. Legal System 514, 515 (Timothy L. Hall ed., 2004). By enter-
ing a guilty plea, the defendant admits responsibility for the crime and knowingly and 
voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See id. 
16 See Murray, supra note 15. 
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supervision or legal protection.”17 This is especially true at the district 
court level, where “the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in 
number than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy 
dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result.”18
 This Note focuses specifically on the current practice in Massachu-
setts of plea bargaining in lobby conferences.19 These plea discussions 
usually take place with a judge behind closed doors, outside of a defen-
dant’s presence, and off the record.20 Court officials believe the infor-
mal atmosphere facilitates settlement.21 It is the criminal defendant, 
however, who pays the price for this efficiency.22 Specifically, the lack of 
                                                                                                                      
17 William Robinson, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas, in Massachusetts Criminal 
Defense § 37.1 (Eric D. Blumenson et al. eds., 1990). 
18 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972). For example, 
[t]he great majority of plea hearings in the Massachusetts district courts con-
sist simply of a hurried recitation of a police report. On occasion, a defen-
dant, usually represented by counsel, will agree with the prosecutor to waive 
the reading of the report and admit to the face of the Complaint, but a judge 
is not bound by this agreement and can insist on hearing evidence. 
Francis D. Doucette, Non-Appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal Cases: A Case Study, 31 
New Eng. L. Rev. 495, 506 (1997). 
19 Even though this Note specifically focuses on plea bargaining in lobby conferences, 
a number of other articles have been written over the years critiquing the practice of plea 
bargaining as a way to relieve court congestion. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense 
Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 Yale L.J. 1179, 1179 (1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, 
Defense Attorney’s Role]. In particular, Professor Alschuler points out that plea bargaining 
makes the outcome of the case depend not on whether the defendant is actually responsi-
ble for the crime, but on “tactical decision[s] irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal 
proceeding.” See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 932 (1983) [hereinafter 
Alschuler, Alternatives to Plea Bargaining]. Alschuler also discusses the effect plea bargaining 
has on the attorneys involved. See id. at 933. He argues that: 
Plea bargaining leads lawyers to view themselves as judges and administrators 
rather than advocates; it subjects them to serious financial and other tempta-
tions to disregard their clients’ interests; and it diminishes the confidence in 
attorney-client relationships that can give dignity and purpose to the legal 
profession and that is essential to the defendant’s sense of fair treatment. 
See id. 
20 See Commonwealth v. Gaumond, No. 98–2813–14–15, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 n.2 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2002). 
21 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
22 See Commonwealth v. Fossa, 666 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). Justice Laur-
ence of the Massachusetts Appeals Court has acknowledged that lobby conferences come 
at a price: “We take judicial notice of the judges’ legitimate concern over the court calen-
dar and the need to move cases along. However, ‘concern for the avoidance of a congested 
[court] calendar must not come at the expense of justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Monahan v. Washburn, 507 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Mass. 1987)). 
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a record makes it nearly impossible for indigent defendants to success-
fully litigate a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a procedural 
safeguard guaranteed to them under the Sixth Amendment.23
 Indigent defendants make up the majority of the cases that plead 
out.24 The defendants’ lack of economic resources renders them de-
pendent on appointed counsel for representation and more vulnerable 
to incompetence.25 At the same time, the large caseloads, low pay, and 
lack of record create financial incentives for attorneys to resolve cases 
as quickly as possible and gives little incentive for other system partici-
pants to hold them accountable.26 This lack of accountability, com-
bined with a justice system that relies on self-interested parties “lobby-
ing” cases in secrecy, eviscerates indigent defendants’ right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment.27 In effect, the current practice of plea 
bargaining in lobby conferences sacrifices the interest of indigent de-
fendants in the name of efficiency.28
 This Note does not advocate doing away with lobby conferences. It 
acknowledges the entrenched practice of lobby conferences in district 
courts and instead argues that the current test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel should reflect the increased burden the current practice 
places on indigent defendants. Part I of this Note will explore the roots 
of lobby conferences in the United States and, more specifically, in 
                                                                                                                      
23 See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1088–89 (2006). 
24 See id. at 1034 (“Poor people account for more than 80% of individuals prosecuted. 
These criminal defendants plead guilty approximately 90% of the time.”). 
25 See Cole, supra note 1, at 76; Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1203–
04. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Strickland, noted that: 
It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a 
lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can 
obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, 
who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and re-
sources to devote to a given case. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
26 See infra notes 59–63, 82–87 and accompanying text (discussing how the current sys-
tem of plea bargaining creates financial incentives for attorneys and administrative incen-
tives for judges to plea cases as quickly as possible). 
27 See Gaumond, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 n.2; Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–
89. The term “lobbying cases” comes from the Gaumond decision and refers to plea bar-
gaining in lobby conferences. See id. 
28 See Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 147, 163 (2001); Murphy, supra note 14, at 
54. Levinson argues that although the Strickland test “may cheat defendants out of proce-
dural fairness, it can be viewed as a necessary evil in the name of judicial economy.” Levin-
son, supra, at 163. 
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Massachusetts. Part II will discuss the current use of lobby conferences 
to facilitate plea bargaining to the exclusion of the criminal defendant. 
Part III will trace the rise of the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel 
revolution” and its recent application to plea bargaining. Part IV will 
analyze how the current use of lobby conferences in Massachusetts vio-
lates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by undermining a criminal 
defendant’s ability to hold appointed counsel accountable. Finally, Part 
V will propose a revised approach to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. The proposal seeks to address the increased burden placed on 
indigent defendants by the practice of plea bargaining in unrecorded 
lobby conferences. 
I. Lobbying Cases 
 The practice of holding unrecorded lobby conferences to relieve 
congestion in the courts is long-standing. Lobby conferences date back 
to the fixed session terms of nineteenth century English courts.29 As 
court case loads increased, English judges began hearing “subsidiary or 
collateral” issues of procedure in their chambers when court was not in 
session to expedite the resolution of cases.30 As a result, the terms 
“chamber conference” and “lobby conference” signified any place 
where the judge heard motions and issued orders when court was not 
in session.31 Historically, courts held these lobby conferences off the 
record.32 By facilitating candid exchanges between attorneys and 
judges, court officials viewed the informal nature of off the record 
lobby conferences as necessary to facilitate plea bargains to help settle 
cases more quickly and efficiently.33 Today the practice is institutional-
ized in the Massachusetts criminal justice system.34
 Even though the debate over recording lobby conferences began 
over thirty years ago, district courts in Massachusetts currently do not 
have a court rule mandating that lobby conferences be recorded.35 As 
                                                                                                                      
 
29 See Von Schmidt v. Widber, 34 P. 109, 110 (Cal. 1893). The English courts had a fixed 
term of ninety-one days when the court could be in session. See id. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
34 See id. 
35 See Mass. Dist. Ct. Spec. R. 211(A)(1); Jerome S. Berg, Rough Justice to Due 
Process: The District Courts of Massachusetts 1869–2004, at 60 (2004) (noting that in 
1974 Chief Justice Flaschner of the Massachusetts Trial Courts advised judges to record lobby 
conferences). Federal law requires that all proceedings in open court in criminal cases be 
recorded. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1) (2000). Similarly, the Special Rules of the District Courts 
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early as 1974, Chief Justice Flaschner advised judges against holding 
lobby conferences off the record.36 More recent cases have also reiter-
ated the stance of the Massachusetts appellate courts, recommending 
that lobby conferences be put on the record.37 Nevertheless, in Massa-
chusetts district courts, the issue of whether lobby conferences should 
be held on the record is left solely to the discretion of the individual 
judges.38 Furthermore, individual attorneys are responsible for sup-
plementing the record after an unrecorded lobby conference.39 Thus, 
even if an issue is raised during a lobby conference, a defendant is pre-
vented from raising the issue on appeal unless the defense attorney 
raised it on the record.40
 In recent years, however, Massachusetts Superior Court judges be-
gan holding lobby conferences on the record or in open court.41 This 
shift was partly due to a highly publicized lawsuit involving a Massachu-
                                                                                                                      
of Massachusetts 211(A)(1) state that “all courtroom proceedings . . . shall be recorded elec-
tronically.” Mass. Dist. Ct. Spec. R. 211(A)(1). Rule 9 of the District Court Supplemental 
Rules of Criminal Procedure extends Rule 211 to criminal cases in the District Court. Mass. 
Dist. Supp. R. Crim. P. 9. Given that recording in Massachusetts district courts is only man-
dated in the courtroom, there is no rule that explicitly guides the recording of out of court 
criminal proceedings, such as lobby conferences. 
36 See Berg, supra note 35, at 60. Judge Flaschner was also critical of bench conferences 
that were held off the record, calling them the “older rough justice model of a District 
Court” that “deteriorated from legal impropriety to making a mockery out of the judicial 
process.” Id. at 54–55. 
37 See Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 758 n.15 (Mass. 2007) (“If there 
was ever a case that demonstrates the need for lobby conferences, where cases or other 
court matters are discussed, to be recorded, this is the case. This litigation, with all its un-
fortunate consequences for those involved, might not have occurred if the critical lobby 
conference. . . . had been transcribed.”); Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 590 N.E.2d 186, 189 
(Mass. 1992) (“[I]f a lobby conference is held, the better practice is to record it, and pro-
vide a copy of the recording to the defendant on request, so that the defendant may know 
what was said.”); Commonwealth v. Rosenfield, 478 N.E.2d 165, 167 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1985) (“We fail to see what purpose an unrecorded bench conference could have served 
in a criminal case without a jury.”). 
38 See Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 758 n.15 (leaving whether to record lobby conferences to 
the discretion of individual judges). 
39 See Am. Bar Ass’n., Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of De-
fense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 92 (rev. ed. 2003). 
40 See, e.g., Zedros v. Kenneth Hudson, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 1279, 1280–81 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1981) (refusing to consider error in an unrecorded closing argument because counsel did 
not request that a record be made). This may raise other plausible arguments against hold-
ing lobby conferences off the record, including the right to fair trial and meaningful ap-
pellate review. However, this Note will only address the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
during the plea bargaining process. 
41 See Gaumond, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 n.2; Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Some Observations and 
Suggestions Regarding the Settlement Activities of Massachusetts Trial Judges, 31 Suffolk U. L. 
Rev. 263, 306–07 (1997). 
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setts Superior Court Judge and statements he allegedly made during an 
off the record lobby conference.42 Many judges feared that the lack of 
record left them vulnerable if an attorney misconstrued their words 
and alleged misconduct, such as coercion to take a plea.43
 Nevertheless, unrecorded lobby conferences maintain a strong-
hold in Massachusetts district courts as an essential tool to facilitate ex-
peditious settlement.44 District courts occupy a unique position in the 
Commonwealth as the “major point of access,” handling “the lion’s 
share of legal business.”45 Even though Massachusetts district courts 
have long been courts of record, it was not until the 1970s that the 
court began to preserve testimony on the record.46 The congestion and 
informality that define district courts are commonly stated reasons for 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 749–51. Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Murphy sued 
the Boston Herald for defamation after an exchange that occurred during an off the record 
lobby conference. Id. The Boston Herald published a series of articles claiming that Judge 
Murphy was lenient on crime, “letting four accused rapists return to the streets in the past 
week, [having] a pro-defendant stance and [having] heartlessly demeaned victims.” Id. 749–
50. The reporter then quoted statements allegedly made by Judge Murphy during an unre-
corded lobby conference when prosecutors confronted the judge about lenient sentencing. 
See id. at 750. The lack of record allowed the reporter to take the Judge’s words out of context 
and, as the jury found, materially change the meaning conveyed by the statements. See id. at 
754–58. 
43 See id. at 749–50. 
44 Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. Gaumond is an example of one judge’s comparison of 
lobby conferences to a process akin to an assembly line: 
A lobby conference is often requested in many criminal cases . . . where the 
parties disagree as to what sentence should be imposed in the event the de-
fendant pleads guilty. The purpose of such a lobby conference then is to de-
termine what sentence the judge will give upon a plea. . . . Resorting to the 
oft used analogy of making sausage, the process of plea negotiation in a lobby 
conference may be messy and even unappealing, but the defendant is eager 
to engage in the process because he seeks to know the flavor of the end re-
sult. In short, the defendant is seeking as much information as possible fore 
[sic] making an important decision. 
Gaumond, 2002 WL 732152, at *2. 
45 Susan S. Silbey, Making Sense of the Lower Courts, 6 Just. Sys. J. 13, 13 (1981). The 
1920s brought reform to Massachusetts district courts, which relieved some of the conges-
tion experienced by the Superior Court. See Berg, supra note 35, at 26–28. The reform 
included increasing the jurisdictional limit for civil cases and granting sole jurisdiction 
over all motor vehicle tort cases to the district courts. See id. 
46 See Commonwealth v. Leach, 141 N.E. 301, 304 (Mass. 1923) (“The district courts of 
this commonwealth are courts of record and of superior and general jurisdiction with 
reference to all matters within their jurisdiction. In this particular, judges of district courts 
stand on the same footing as judges of the superior court.”); Berg, supra note 35, at 58–59. 
Up until the 1970s, the Superior Court reviewed criminal and juvenile appeals on a de 
novo basis. See Berg, supra note 35, at 64. The courts rationalized that there was no need to 
preserve testimony because it was not being used in re-trials. See id. 
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maintaining lobby conferences off the record.47 The most relied upon 
policy arguments in favor of the current practice are from the perspec-
tive of court administration.48 The voices of criminal defendants, on 
the other hand, have been missing from this debate.49
II. Back-Room Dealing and the Indigent Defendant 
 To echo language used in Commonwealth v. Gaumond, a plea agree-
ment negotiated in a lobby conference between the judge and the law-
yers may be regarded by the public, the defendant, and the victim as a 
“back room deal.”50 The potential for abuse stems from the self-interest 
of the parties involved and the lack of accountability in these secret pro-
ceedings.51
 The criminal justice system presumes that the defendant’s rights 
are represented merely because he has counsel.52 Even when a criminal 
defendant is acting pro se, the Massachusetts courts have found no 
prejudice when the defendant was excluded from the proceeding be-
cause he was deemed to be represented by standby counsel.53 The 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
48 See id. 
49 See, e.g., Agnes, supra note 41, at 308 (discussing the policy behind lobby conferences 
solely from judge’s perspective). 
50 See 2002 WL 732152, at *4 n.2. Even though Gaumond involved a sidebar discussion 
between the judge and the parties on the record, the judge goes on to state that lobby 
conferences 
are in essence “back room deals” that do not involve the defendant, the vic-
tim, or the public. No matter how fair a judge is in the lobby conference . . . it 
is usually only the judge and the lawyers participating. Any plea agreement 
negotiated in such a private setting is likely to be misunderstood by the pub-
lic, the defendant, or the victim. 
Id. 
51 See id. 
52 Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 1213, 1228 (2006) (“Courts often conclude that defendant’s absence does 
not violate the defendant’s right because they assume that counsel will protect the defen-
dant’s interests in the hearing. But the defendant depends on counsel to raise the issue of 
the defendant’s absence as well as all other issues important to the defense.”). 
53 See United States v. Bullard, 37 F.3d 765, 767 (1st Cir. 1994). Defendant, acting pro se, 
was allegedly excluded from a lobby conference regarding the disqualification of a juror. 
See id. The defendant was also excluded from the subsequent questioning of the juror. See 
id. Instead the judge permitted standby counsel to represent defendant’s interests at these 
proceedings. See id. The reviewing court found no prejudice because standby counsel was 
present. See id. The court also refused to find error because the record was incomplete and 
did not clearly indicate that the defendant was absent. See id. Thus, in denying the defen-
dant’s appeal, the reviewing court presumed that the defendant’s interests were being 
represented by the presence of counsel. See id. 
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court’s presumption in favor of defense counsel does not account for 
any of the incentives the attorney may have to act in self-interest.54 As a 
result, the current practice of relying on the defense attorney to sup-
plement the record after the fact is entirely inadequate to safeguard the 
rights of the criminal defendant.55
A. The Judge 
 Judges are under administrative pressures “to move cases along 
and discourage trials.”56 The Administrative Office of the Trial Courts 
(AOTC) imposes time standards on every case.57 The performance of 
each judge is measured against these standards.58 Therefore, a district 
court judge must try to move his or her docket along expidiously.59 
There is tremendous incentive for the judge to appoint counsel that 
will help to dispose of cases quickly.60 The practice of unrecorded lobby 
conferences allows the judge to negotiate the disposition of cases with 
only the attorneys present.61 In Massachusetts, the current practice was 
best articulated in a recent letter to the editor from current Superior 
Court Judge Murphy: 
 [T]here are hundreds of real lobby conferences conducted 
by judges of all departments of the Trial Court every single 
day. . . . 
 . . . . 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their 
Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 Nev. L.J. 521, 542 (2007). 
57 See Berg, supra note 35, at 115. In 1980, the District Court Committee on Caseflow 
Management issued Standards of Judicial Practice, Caseflow Management, which assigned trial 
dates for disposition of cases, caseload limits, and limited the number of continuances for 
each case. Id. The AOTC is responsible for administration of all the Trial Courts in Massa-
chusetts. The Administrative Office of the Trial Court, http://www.mass.gov/courts/admin/ 
aotc.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
58 See Margaret H. Marshall, Justice “Promptly, and Without Delay”: Court Reform and Judi-
cial Independence, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 172 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/2008/ 
03/18/Marshall.html. 
59 See id. 
60 See Cole, supra note 1, at 89. Cole argues that an experienced attorney can make a 
judge’s life difficult by “expend[ing] considerable time and resources” filing motions, 
developing evidence, and challenging errors. See id. This provides incentive to the judge to 
appoint a less qualified attorney to an indigent defendant in the interest of expediting the 
case. See id. 
61 Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
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 [T]he lobby gives the interested parties the ability to cut to 
the chase and discuss the real strengths and weaknesses of the 
case, as well as the considerations involved in an appropriate 
sentencing. 
 . . . . 
 [T]here are many times when a judge, in the course of a re-
laxed brainstorming session with counsel, will conjure up a 
settlement modality that has not even been considered by the 
parties, and which will settle a three-week case in one morn-
ing. 
 There are times when, although a global settlement may 
not be possible, the court may persuade counsel to waive 
some legal theory in the interests of efficiency.62
Even though Judge Murphy was recently involved in a lawsuit that arose 
during an unrecorded lobby conference, he maintains a steadfast 
commitment to the practice.63 But it is clear from Judge Murphy’s own 
words that, to the exclusion of the defendant, the judge and the attor-
ney strike deals “in the interests of efficiency.”64
B. The Attorney 
 In addition to building a rapport with the judge, defense attor-
neys—appointed counsel in particular—may have financial incentive to 
cut a deal.65 Professor Alschuler outlines two ways for private defense 
counsel to reach financial success.66 In the first option, the attorney’s 
reputation as a great trial lawyer brings in wealthy clients to whom he is 
able to devote a lot of his time.67 However, building up one’s practice 
can take a matter of years and can be difficult.68 The second option, 
which seems more realistic for a greater number of attorneys, is to take 
on more cases for less pay.69 The concern with this second approach is 
that it creates financial incentive for an attorney to plea bargain for a 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. 
63 See Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 749–51 (Mass. 2007); Murphy, 
supra note 14, at 54. 
64 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
65 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1182. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
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“quick buck.”70 Professor Alschuler points out that the second option 
has become so common that it has earned some lawyers a negative la-
bel by members of their own criminal bar as “wholesalers” or “cop out 
lawyers.”71 Furthermore, if an attorney is able to collect a fixed fee in 
advance from a client, he has even more incentive to dispose of the 
case as quickly as possible.72
 In Massachusetts, the low pay for appointed counsel can create 
similar financial incentives for attorneys to plea bargain.73 Massachu-
setts representation of indigent defendants depends on a hybrid system 
of 110 full-time CPCS attorneys and 2400 private court appointed at-
torneys.74 Even though the full-time CPCS attorneys are salaried, the 
majority of the cases are handled by private counsel on an hourly ba-
sis.75 The hourly rate is set by the CPCS and approved by the Massachu-
setts legislature.76 Even with the recent pay increase, commentators 
routinely criticize Massachusetts public officials for maintaining some 
of the lowest paid appointed counsel in the country.77 As a result, as 
Professor Alschuler points out, the low pay provides defense counsel 
with an incentive to take on more cases than they can try on the as-
sumption that most of them will settle during plea negotiations.78
 In light of the current shortage of appointed counsel in Massachu-
setts, attorneys that represent indigent defendants often take on large 
caseloads.79 If an attorney is forced to sacrifice time or resources be-
cause of their large caseload, the sacrifice often comes at the expense 
of the indigent defendant, not a paying client.80 As a result, a defense 
attorney has an extraordinary amount of incentive to foster the rapid 
turnover of cases through plea bargaining, while at the same time pre-
                                                                                                                      
70 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1182. This is not to say that 
most defense attorneys only care about profit. See id. Rather, this Note argues that the cur-
rent system is designed in a way that encourages this type of abuse. Lobby conferences, in 
particular, foster this type of abuse because they take place in front of the judge, without 
the defendant and off the record. 
71 See id. at 1182–84. 
72 See id. at 1200. 
73 See Spangenberg Group, supra note 3, at 2; Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra 
note 19, at 1182. 
74 See Spangenberg Group, supra note 3, at 1. 
75 See id. at 1, 2. 
76 See id. at 2. 
77 Editorial, An Open Letter to the Candidates, Mass. Law. Wkly., Sept. 25, 2006, at 62. 
78 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1182. 
79 See Spangenberg Group, supra note 3, at 1; Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra 
note 19, at 1182. 
80 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1182, 1203. 
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serving personal relationships with other system participants.81 In addi-
tion, given that lobby conferences happen behind closed doors without 
any record of the proceeding, the defense attorney “is not subject to 
review by the people who pay for it or by anyone else.”82 This current 
practice of plea bargaining gives little incentive for any system partici-
pant, other than the defendant, to hold appointed counsel account-
able.83 As the only one with an incentive to hold defense counsel ac-
countable, an indigent defendant becomes the only one with the 
burden.84
C. The Absent Defendant 
 In the current framework, the potential for abuse in lobby confer-
ences is exacerbated by the fact that the law considers the defendant’s 
role in the process subservient to his attorney’s primary role and so the 
defendant is often left out of the proceeding.85 In Jones v. Barnes, the 
Court held that the defendant has the “ultimate authority to make cer-
tain fundamental decisions regarding the case.”86 This includes whether 
to plead guilty and whether to accept a plea agreement.87 However in 
reality, “over 90 percent of criminal defendants plead guilty, generally 
without any significant time expended on their case. In recent studies, 
between half and four-fifths of counsel entered pleas without interview-
ing any prosecution witnesses, and four-fifths did so without filing any 
defense motions.”88 Another study in a survey of about 700 public de-
fenders found that 46.7% somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that they 
should secure their client’s consent before seeking plea agreements 
from the prosecutor; the remainder somewhat disagreed or strongly 
disagreed.89
                                                                                                                      
81 See id. at 1198. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See Poulin, supra note 52, at 1228; Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation 
of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attor-
ney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 7 & n.22 (1998). 
86 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
87 Id. 
88 Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 124 (2004). 
89 See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 85, at 32, 41. Although the survey focused on de-
fense attorneys in the public defender’s office, the study is relevant to this discussion be-
cause it reflects the quality of representation indigent defendants receive in this country. 
Id. 
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 Likewise, the current practice of lobby conferences fosters this 
lawyer-centered model where the lawyer—as a detached expert—is per-
ceived to be in a better position to make strategic decisions.90 Under 
this model, the defendant is perceived to be a hindrance to the candid 
exchange between skilled professionals and is thus excluded from the 
lobby conference.91 This model is even more problematic with indigent 
defendants who do not choose their lawyers and have no guarantee of a 
“meaningful” relationship with appointed counsel.92 As a result, the 
current framework compromises the voice of the indigent defendant in 
the name of efficiency.93
III. The Rise of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
[T]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on 
the amount of money he has.94
 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense.”95 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel at-
taches at the time judicial proceedings are initiated and extends to sub-
sequent plea negotiations.96 The Supreme Court in later cases ex-
panded the constitutional right to state courts, as well as to felony and 
misdemeanor offenses.97 In 1963 the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wain-
                                                                                                                      
 
90 See id. at 7 & n.22. 
91 See id. 
92 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (rejected the notion that Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees a defendant a meaningful attorney-client relationship). However, this 
does not preclude counsel from having “an obligation to seek to develop a relationship of 
trust with [a] client.” Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The 
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 323, 375. 
93 See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 85, at 7; Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
94 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 21 (1956) (holding that an indigent defendant is 
entitled to a copy of the transcript regardless of his ability to pay). 
95 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
96 State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). Even though a criminal 
defendant does not have a constitutional guarantee to a plea bargain, once the state initi-
ates plea negotiations the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be “adequately in-
formed of consequences before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer.” See id.; see 
also United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379–80 (2nd Cir. 1998) (concluding that a de-
fendant has a right to counsel during plea negotiations). 
97 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 
344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 
(1932). In Powell v. Alabama the Supreme Court for the first time recognized the right to 
counsel for indigent defendants, but the Court limited the right to state capital cases. See 287 
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right expanded the right to counsel beyond capital cases to all indigent 
criminal defendants and recognized that “any person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided.”98
 In 1970, the Supreme Court clarified in McMann v. Richardson that 
the right to counsel is a right to “effective assistance of competent 
counsel.”99 The Court held that an attorney must meet minimum stan-
dards of competence to ensure effective assistance of counsel.100 Strick-
land v. Washington set up a two-prong test that a criminal defendant 
must meet to hold his lawyer accountable for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.101 Under the two-prong test the defendant must show: (1) his 
attorney’s deficient representation, and (2) that the deficiency preju-
diced his defense.102 In reviewing counsel’s performance the court 
takes the totality of circumstances into consideration but with a “strong 
presumption” that the attorney’s conduct was adequate.103 The court in 
Strickland went on to point out that the test was in no way meant to 
“improve the quality of legal representation,” but was meant to provide 
a procedural safeguard for the Sixth Amendment by ensuring that the 
procedure the court followed is fair and just.104
 In 1985, the Supreme Court for the first time applied the Strickland 
test to challenges of guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of coun-
                                                                                                                      
U.S. at 71 (“[T]he necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial 
court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Six years later, the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee was upheld in all federal criminal prosecutions. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463. Later it was 
extended to all criminal felony prosecutions, including state felonies. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 
341–44. In 1972, the Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment to misdemeanors as well 
as felonies. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
98 See 372 U.S. at 344. Even though the Supreme Court first recognized an indigent de-
fendant’s right to appointed counsel in Powell v. Alabama, it was not until Gideon v. Wain-
right that the right was expanded beyond capital cases to all criminal defendants. See 
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. The Court in Gideon went on to proclaim 
that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.” 372 U.S. at 344. 
99 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
100 See id. 
101 See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 690 (“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assis-
tance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judg-
ment.”). The reasonableness of the lawyer’s conduct must be assessed in light of the facts 
as they were known to the attorney at the time. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 
(2000). Furthermore, as long as the lawyer’s conduct may be attributed to “sound trial 
strategy” the court will avoid second guessing it. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
186 (1986). 
104 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
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sel.105 In the context of plea bargaining, the fairness of the trial be-
comes irrelevant; the fairness of the plea process is the sole focus of the 
test.106 The Court held that a guilty plea must be “a voluntary and intel-
ligent choice,” and it may be challenged for ineffective assistance of 
counsel if an attorney did not provide “reasonably competent ad-
vice.”107 To meet the Strickland test, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that the attorney’s conduct was proper.108 In order to 
meet the first prong of the test the defendant must show that the attor-
ney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.109 This merely amounts to the minimum standards of competence 
set out in McMann.110 The second prong is deemed satisfied if “there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”111 Under Strickland, a “reasonable probability is a probability suf-
ficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”112 The defendant 
can also meet the prejudice prong of the test if he can show that “he 
would have accepted the plea but for counsel’s advice, and that had he 
done so he would have received a lesser sentence.”113
 The defendant must not merely allege that he would have plead 
differently, but actually support it with objective facts on the record to 
allow the court to meaningfully assess the claim.114 Hill v. Lockhart illus-
trates how difficult it is for a defendant to meet the prejudice prong 
without a complete record.115 Even though the defendant was able to 
show that his attorney improperly advised him as to when he would be 
eligible for parole, the Court held that the defendant did not satisfy 
“the kind of prejudice necessary” because he did not allege any “special 
circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed par-
                                                                                                                      
105 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In Lockhart the defendant appealed his 
conviction, claiming the guilty plea was involuntary. See id. at 54. The defendant argued 
that he plead guilty in large part relying on his attorney’s erroneous advice about his pa-
role eligibility. See id. at 55. The defendant was told by his attorney that he would be eligi-
ble for parole after serving one third of his prison sentence, even though state law man-
dated one half before being eligible for parole. See id. 
106 See Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2001). 
107 See Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56; McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71. 
108 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
109 See Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 57. 
110 See id. at 58–59. 
111 Id. at 59; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
112 466 U.S. at 694. 
113 See Wanatee, 259 F.3d at 704. 
114 See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883–84 (Mass. 1974). Massachusetts 
courts base the decision on “specific circumstances of the given case.” See id. at 883. 
115 See 474 U.S. at 60. 
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ticular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to 
plead guilty.”116 The Court reasoned that defendant’s mistaken belief 
that he would be eligible for early parole did not alter his decision 
about whether or not to go to trial.117
 In his concurring opinion, Justice White argued that failure to in-
form the defendant of relevant law pertaining to his case satisfied the 
first prong of the Strickland test.118 Even though he criticized the major-
ity opinion, Justice White still emphasized the importance of the lack of 
a complete court record to the Strickland analysis.119 Justice White 
noted that had the record stated that the defense counsel was aware of 
the defendant’s prior conviction, which would make him ineligible for 
early release, the defendant would have been entitled to a hearing for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.120 Subsequently, the Strickland test has 
proven to be a tough hurdle for defendants to overcome even in egre-
gious cases, with the prejudice prong posing the biggest challenge.121 
Despite this, the test remains a crucial tool for defendants to hold their 
attorneys accountable to ensure fairness in the plea bargaining proc-
ess.122 Given that the majority of criminal cases are resolved without 
                                                                                                                      
116 See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
117 See id. The court reasoned: 
Indeed, petitioner’s mistaken belief that he would become eligible for parole 
after serving one-third of his sentence would seem to have affected not only 
his calculation of the time he likely would serve if sentenced pursuant to the 
proposed plea agreement, but also his calculation of the time he likely would 
serve if he went to trial and were convicted. 
Id. 
118 See id. at 62 (White, J., concurring). 
119 See id. at 62–63 (concurring with the majority because the record failed to show that 
the attorney knew of defendant’s prior conviction). 
120 See Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 63. 
121 Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–89 & n.304; see, e.g., People v. Garrison, 
765 P.2d 419, 440–41 (Cal. 1989) (holding that defendant was not denied effective assis-
tance of counsel where defense counsel was arrested driving to court with 0.27 blood-
alcohol content); People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that 
defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where the defense attorney slept 
through a portion of the trial); People v. Badia, 552 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (App. Div. 1990) 
(holding that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where the defense 
attorney admitted to using heroin and cocaine during trial); see also Vivian Berger, The 
Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 245, 245–249 (1991) (summarizing additional cases). 
122 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1179; cf, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000) (holding that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel 
where defense attorney “failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evi-
dence” at sentencing). 
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trial, analyzing Strickland in the context of plea negotiations provides a 
more realistic understanding of how the test is used today.123
IV. Enforcing the Indigent Defendant’s Sixth Amendment  
Right to Counsel 
 In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the new 
standard was meant to safeguard criminal defendants’ Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial.124 Justice O’Connor articulated that “the ulti-
mate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the pro-
ceeding whose result is being challenged.”125 In 2000, the Supreme 
Court again reaffirmed that procedural rights are the underpinning of 
the constitutional protection in Strickland.126
 The current practice in Massachusetts of plea bargaining in lobby 
conferences violates the policy of procedural fairness articulated by Jus-
tice O’Connor in Strickland.127 In Massachusetts district courts, plea 
bargaining takes place behind closed doors in the judge’s chambers, 
without the defendant and without any record of the proceeding.128 
There are no uniform standards for the plea bargaining process in or-
der to accommodate the variety of cases and proceedings before the 
court.129 This lack of standardization, when combined with the lack of 
record at lobby conferences, renders the standard under Strickland ex-
traordinarily difficult for the defendant to meet.130 If a criminal defen-
dant wants to file a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the de-
fendant must meet both prongs of the Strickland test.131 Even though a 
defendant may be able to identify particular problems in the attorney’s 
representation, the prejudice prong of the test is the biggest hurdle for 
                                                                                                                      
123 Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1179; Murray, supra note 15. 
124 See 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
125 Id. at 696. 
126 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). In Williams, the trial court found 
that the attorney’s failure to introduce defendant’s violent childhood and psychological 
records at sentencing was not a tactical decision, but was due to attorney’s erroneous belief 
that state law prohibited such evidence. See id. at 395. The Court concluded that the preju-
dice prong of the Strickland test was met because there was a reasonable probability that 
the sentencing proceeding would have had a different outcome had counsel explained the 
significance of all the evidence available at the time. See id. at 398–99. The Court, in find-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel, relied solely on the post-conviction record. See id. 
127 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–89. 
128 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gaumond, No. 98–2813–14–15, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 
n.2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2002). 
129 White, supra note 92, at 373. 
130 See Cole, supra note 1, at 78; Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–89. 
131 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
2009] Lobby Conferences & Constitutional Rights of Indigent Defendants 311 
defendants to overcome.132 This is because the court largely relies on 
the record to determine whether the second prong of the test has been 
met.133
 Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Strickland, specifically 
critiqued the Court’s reliance on the record to prove the prejudice 
prong.134 He noted “the possibility that evidence of injury to the de-
fendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the in-
competence of defense counsel.”135 As a result, the burden of supple-
menting the record falls on the defendant.136 By filing the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant is already put at a disadvan-
tage because of the need to secure other counsel or risk proceeding 
without one.137 The practical problems of supplementing the record 
after the fact may create gaps that will further hinder the defendant’s 
ability to satisfy the prejudice prong.138 The defendant may also be fac-
ing a real possibility that the parties present at the lobby conference 
may no longer be able to recall the proceeding in detail.139 The de-
fense attorney, along with other system players present at the lobby 
conference, may have incentive to refrain from revealing the miscon-
duct in order to avoid being professionally disciplined, or to safeguard 
a rapport with the judge.140 As a result, the defendant must rely on an 
incomplete record to satisfy what is already a demanding test.141
 Lobby conferences violate the policy of procedural fairness articu-
lated by Justice O’Connor in Strickland because they undermine the 
policy of equity that has shaped the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
jurisprudence.142 Strickland is part of a long line of cases that make up 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1089. 
133 See id. 
134 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. 
136 See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A 
Dead End?, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 9, 70 (1986). 
137 See id. at 70 n.309. 
138 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 n.4 (Marshall J., dissenting) (“When defense counsel 
fails to take certain actions, not because he is ‘compelled’ to do so, but because he is in-
competent, it is often equally difficult to ascertain the prejudice consequent upon his 
omissions.”). 
139 See Berger, supra note 136, at 70 n.309. 
140 See id.; see also, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 390 n.3 (1985). The United States 
District Court for the District of Kentucky found ineffective assistance of counsel and re-
ferred the defendant’s attorney to the Board of Governors of the Kentucky State Bar Asso-
ciation for disciplinary proceeding. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 390 n.3. 
141 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
142 See id. at 689; Jessa DeSimone, Comment, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana 
Public Defender Act, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1479, 1479 (2006). 
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the “right to counsel revolution.”143 The right to counsel was included 
in the Bill of Rights to create a level playing field and protect against 
the power of the state.144 It was also meant to “‘breathe life into the 
promise’ of the other Sixth Amendment guarantees,” such as the right 
to trial by jury, the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to con-
front and compel witnesses, and the right to notice of charges.145
 Equity was the bedrock of the right to counsel revolution.146 From 
the beginning, the Court saw the right to counsel as a necessity to en-
sure the fundamental fairness of the criminal process against the ac-
tions of the state.147 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court upheld 
the right to counsel specifically to address the “tremendous advantage” 
of the prosecution over the lay person.148 The Court recognized the 
imbalance of power between the prosecutor, who had the resources of 
the state, and a criminal defendant, who most often did not have the 
knowledge or the skills to negotiate the complexity of the legal sys-
tem.149 Powell held that the court has an obligation to safeguard these 
rights and appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, even when the 
defendant failed to request one.150 Thus, according to Powell, the re-
sponsibility for ensuring the equitable balance of powers rests with the 
court, not the criminal defendant.151
 The lack of record at lobby conferences means that the appellate 
court is no longer able to hold attorneys accountable, and the fate of 
the criminal defendant rests entirely on the integrity of his counsel.152 
                                                                                                                      
143 See DeSimone, supra note 142, at 1479, 1482–83. 
144 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66–68 (1932); Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright 
Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1635, 1640–41 (2003). 
145 See Metzger, supra note 144, at 1640 & n.25 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, The Con-
stitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 139 (1997)). 
146 See id. at 1640, 1642. 
147 See id. at 1642. The colonists, for example, instituted a comparable guarantee to the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 1639–40. Many of the colonies rationalized 
the guarantee as a necessity to protect against prosecutorial privilege, governmental over-
reaching and to give “a fighting chance against the prosecution.” Id. at 1639. The guaran-
tee meant to empower the ordinary citizen against what was seen as the “tremendous ad-
vantage” of the prosecution. Id. at 1640. 
148 See id. at 1642. Powell held that an indigent defendant’s right to counsel was violated 
when the court appointed counsel in a capital case on the morning of the trial. See 287 
U.S. at 53–56. The court reasoned that the last minute appointment did not allow the at-
torney enough time to adequately prepare for the trial. See id. at 58–59. 
149 See Metzger, supra note 144, at 1642. 
150 287 U.S. at 73. 
151 See id.; Metzger, supra note 144, at 1642–43. 
152 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1195, 1198; Backus & Marcus, 
supra note 23, 1088–89. 
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At the same time, the defendant’s ability to hold his attorney account-
able rests at the discretion of the individual trial judge’s willingness to 
record these lobby conferences.153 Because lobby conferences are held 
for the purpose of settling cases as efficiently as possible, the primary 
focus is not equity.154 Thus, the current framework in Massachusetts 
hinders a defendant from asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim and erodes this “essential barrier against arbitrary or unjust dep-
rivation of human rights.”155
V. Procedural Solution to Safeguard the Indigent Defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
 The practice of lobbying cases to relieve court congestion under-
mines the defendant’s ability to take advantage of a procedural safe-
guard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.156 Lobby conferences rob 
the defendant of the right to relief where there is ineffective assistance 
of counsel and deprive the court of an important tool of equity.157 As a 
remedy, Massachusetts should adopt a categorical presumption of 
prejudice in assessing the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim arising in the context of lobby conferences. This approach serves 
the policy of equity that has long defined the “right to counsel revolu-
tion” by remedying the increased burden lobbying cases places on the 
defendant.158 In addition, this approach is consistent with the approach 
articulated by Justice Brennan in the context of conflict of interest cases 
but avoids the pitfalls of a blanket rule that mandates recording of 
lobby conferences.159
A. Pitfalls of Mandating the Recording of Lobby Conferences 
 In an attempt to resolve the conflict between efficiency and the 
increased burden on the criminal defendant, many states mandate the 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 758 n.15 (Mass. 2007). 
154 See Levinson, supra note 28, at 163; Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
155 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). Johnson marked a shift where the Court 
no longer engaged in case by case analysis and extended the right to counsel to all indi-
gent defendants in federal courts. See Metzger, supra note 144, at 1644. 
156 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); Murphy, supra note 14, at 
54. 
157 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–89; Metzger, supra note 144, at 1642. 
158 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66–68 (1932); Metzger, supra note 144, at 1640–
41. 
159 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 353–54 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring); see 
also, e.g., People v. Freeman, 882 P.2d 249, 283 (Cal. 1994). 
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recording of lobby conferences in criminal proceedings.160 The ap-
proaches taken by different states vary in the amount of discretion a 
judge has in deciding whether to record lobby conferences.161 Even 
though the language and strictness of these rules vary, the result re-
mains the same: these policies have failed to create a more complete 
record.162 This is because judges are still the ones interpreting and ap-
plying these rules.163 Across these jurisdictions, judges conclude that 
failure to follow the rules is harmless error.164 The few times that the 
courts found that failure to record lobby conferences was not a harm-
                                                                                                                      
160 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–14–307 (West 2007); State v. Hammons, 737 S.W.2d 
549, 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The Hammons court recognized that the state of Ten-
nessee specifically mandates that every criminal proceeding, whether or not it is held in 
open court, must have a court reporter present to preserve the record for appellate review. 
Hammons, 737 S.W.2d at 551. In accordance with this rule, the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
opinion stated: 
The holding of off-the-record bench conferences impairs the ability of this 
Court to afford the parties a full and complete review of the issues. Such con-
ferences create a void in the record, and prevent this Court from determining 
why the trial court may have ruled in a certain manner. For this reason trial 
judges should not conduct off-the-record bench conferences. 
See id. Nevertheless, the reviewing court did not find that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in conducting the proceedings off the record. See id. at 552. Even though the review-
ing court acknowledged that the record did not provide much information about what was 
discussed at these proceedings, the court concluded that “it takes very little imagination to 
perceive the reason why” the trial court did not accept the plea agreement which formed 
the basis for defendant’s appeal. See id. 551–52. In the end, even though there was a clear 
violation of the state statute, the reviewing court failed to find a violation of defendant’s 
procedural rights. See id. 
161 See Hammons, 737 S.W.2d at 551–52. Compare Jones v. Dist. Court of Second Judicial 
Dist., 780 P.2d 526, 528–29 (Colo. 1989) (concluding that the court has an affirmative duty 
to ensure that all proceedings are recorded), with Atkins v. State, 558 S.E.2d 755, 759 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the defendant has the burden to supplement the record 
after the fact). 
162 See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 420 S.E.2d 437, 441 (N.C. 1992) (finding harmless error 
because seven unrecorded bench conferences did not result in any “significant ruling”). 
163 See Cal. Penal Code § 190.9(a)(1) (West 2008) (“In any case in which a death sen-
tence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the superior court, including all con-
ferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference in the courtroom, or in 
chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present.”); Freeman, 882 
P.2d at 283. Even though the reviewing court stressed that all proceedings must be on the 
record, they applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Freeman, 882 P.2d at 284. 
Given the high standard of review, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court 
in conducting proceedings off the record. See id. 
164 See, e.g., Freeman, 882 P.2d at 283; Pittman, 420 S.E.2d at 441. For example in Free-
man, the reviewing court’s rationale was self-defeating. See 882 P.2d at 283–84. The court 
found harmless error, reasoning that the defendant could settle the record when the par-
ties retuned to open court and on the record. See id. However, in practice, the trial judge 
maintained the final discretion in deciding what went on the record. See id. 
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less error occured when a defendant proved a clear Constitutional vio-
lation in addition to the lack of record.165 For example, in Sudler v. 
State, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the lack of record preju-
diced the defendant, but only in the context of his right to a trial by 
jury.166 Even in jurisdictions that mandate the recording of lobby con-
ferences, the policy of efficiency may outweigh the criminal defendant’s 
interests in recorded lobby conferences.167 Similarly, in Massachusetts, 
judges would most likely circumvent a rule mandating the recording of 
lobby conferences and would continue to deny indigent defendants 
effective relief.168
 In Douglas v. California, decided on the same day as Gideon v. Wain-
right, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to appellate 
cases.169 In that decision the Court stressed equal protection to the 
“rich and poor alike.”170 The Court stated that “where the record is un-
clear or the errors are hidden, [an indigent defendant] has only the 
right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful ap-
peal.”171 In this landmark opinion, the Court for the first time recog-
nized what may be seen as discrimination based on poverty.172
 However, when only the rich are able to take advantage of these 
procedural safeguards, the courts are discriminating against indigent 
defendants.173 Adopting a rule that judges will circumvent only per-
petuates discrimination against indigent defendants by denying them 
                                                                                                                      
165 See, e.g., Sudler v. State, 611 A.2d 945, 947 (Del. 1992). In Sudler, after holding at 
least five unrecorded bench conferences, the trial judge dismissed five jurors after the 
criminal trial had already begun and without the required finding of necessity on the re-
cord. See id. at 947–48. The court reversed the conviction because the trial judge reduced 
the panel of jurors below the constitutionally mandated number without a record of any 
preliminary findings. See id. at 948. Even after such a blatant constitutional violation, the 
reviewing court stepped in only after the trial court was unable to reconstruct the record 
on remand. See id. at 946. The court held that failure to record the five sidebar confer-
ences hampered effective appellate review. See id. at 947. The court reasoned that, “[i]t is 
inappropriate to recreate sidebar conferences ex post facto, particularly after the trial judge 
has taken irrevocable steps, related to or resulting from sidebar conferences, that effec-
tively violated a fundamental right of the defendant.” See id. 
166 See id. at 946–47. 
167 See, e.g., Freeman, 882 P.2d at 283. 
168 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963). 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 356. 
171 Id. at 358. 
172 See id. 
173 See Cole, supra note 1, at 69 (“Every day our system offers opportunities and privi-
leges to those who can afford them while denying them to those who cannot. Any public 
good that is available at a price effectively discriminates against the poor . . . .”). 
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constitutionally guaranteed relief.174 A defendant with means, who is 
not satisfied with the representation, will be able to seek different 
counsel.175 An indigent defendant, on the other hand, does not have 
the financial means to pick initial counsel or seek a replacement if the 
current one proves to be ineffective.176 In a system where defense coun-
sel is seen as the “‘equalizer’ in the [plea] bargaining process,” failure 
to do his or her job leaves only the procedural safeguard to protect the 
substantive rights of the defendant in the adversarial system.177 The 
current practice of plea bargaining jeopardizes this procedural safe-
guard because any gaps in the record increase the likelihood that an 
indigent defendant will not be able to meet the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.178
B. Benefits of a Categorical Presumption 
 Resolving the current conflict will require a solution that recog-
nizes the entrenched practice of lobby conferences in Massachusetts 
district courts, as well as balance the increased burden the current prac-
tice places on an indigent defendant.179 The Supreme Court, in laying 
out the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, recognized that the 
prejudice prong of the test may be satisfied without the case-by-case 
analysis.180 The Court proposed that a categorical presumption of the 
prejudice prong may be deemed satisfied when violations are easy for 
government to identify and correct: 
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. 
Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel alto-
gether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are vari-
ous kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance. . . . 
Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the 
Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that 
                                                                                                                      
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 76 (describing how wealthy people can afford to be discriminating when 
choosing counsel). 
176 See id. 
177 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 19, at 1179; see also Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. 
178 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–89 (noting that the appellate court will 
review the trial record to assess whether the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim has been met). 
179 See id.; Murphy, supra note 14, at 54. 
180 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
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reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, 
easy for the government to prevent.181
The lack of record at lobby conferences acts as a “constructive denial of 
the assistance of counsel” because both the prosecution and the judge 
are aware of it and it is within their power to prevent.182
 In addition to being easy to identify and correct, placing the bur-
den for holding off the record lobby conferences on the prosecution 
and the court is consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s policy of eq-
uity.183 The Supreme Court has recognized that “the Sixth Amendment 
does more than require the States to appoint counsel for indigent de-
fendants. . . . [Holding] a criminal trial itself implicates the State.”184 
Procedural fairness requires that both the courts and the prosecution 
share the burden of perpetuating a practice that undermines a criminal 
defendant’s right to counsel, especially one that is within their power to 
correct.185
 Adopting a categorical approach, which presumes the satisfaction 
of the prejudice prong, should be limited to instances where the court 
holds lobby conferences off the record and the defendant alleges that 
ineffective assistance arose out of these proceedings. With the prejudi-
cial prong under Strickland presumed satisfied, an indigent defendant 
no longer has the burden of supplementing the record and is left to 
prove the performance prong of the Strickland test.186 The Court in 
Strickland wanted to make sure that the rule would allow for variation in 
tactical decisions that an attorney may adopt.187 The rule would not 
                                                                                                                      
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 66–68; Metzger, supra note 144, at 1640–41. 
184 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344. 
185 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1084–86. The authors explain that: 
 Prosecutors and judges must also bear some responsibility in maintaining 
. . . standards within the criminal justice system . . . . 
 . . . . 
 In appointing counsel, monitoring pretrial activities and evaluation coun-
sel’s preparedness, observing courtroom performance and participating in 
plea bargaining negotiations, the judge must be cognizant that “[i]t is the 
judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a 
fair and lawful trial.” 
Id. (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1978)); see also Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (“Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is 
conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. . . . The trial court should 
protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel.”). 
186 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
187 See id. at 688–89. 
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affect this part of the test because the presumption that the attorney’s 
conduct was adequate is part of the performance prong of the test.188 
The reviewing court, in adopting the rule that lobby conferences are 
per se prejudicial to criminal defendants, would still require the defen-
dant to overcome the presumption that the attorney’s conduct was 
adequate.189 This approach will guarantee that “fair process [is] an es-
sential element of an adversary system.”190
C. Justice Brennan’s Approach 
 There are quite a number of cases where the Court has held that a 
showing of prejudice is presumed satisfied.191 These include where de-
fendant was deprived counsel by the court, when counsel was absent 
during a critical stage of trial, where the attorney was not licensed to 
practice law, where counsel was implicated in defendant’s crime, where 
counsel’s performance was extremely egregious, and where counsel 
had a conflict of interest.192 These categories define a continuum of 
cases where the Court has found that the prejudice prong of the Strick-
land test satisfied.193
 The conflicts of interest that arise in lobby conferences are analo-
gous to those that arise in the context of multiple representation 
cases.194 Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
                                                                                                                      
 
188 See id. at 689. 
189 See id. at 687. 
190 See Metzger, supra note 144, at 1642. Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Strick-
land proposed a more extreme version of this approach. See 466 U.S. at 710–12 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). He stated that if the defendant is able to satisfy the performance prong of 
the test, then a defendant should not have to prove the prejudice prong. Id. Justice Mar-
shall reasoned that if the attorney’s conduct fell below standards prescribed by the Consti-
tution then the defendant should not have the added burden of proving that the attor-
ney’s deficiency affected his case. Id. In those instances, Justice Marshall believed that the 
prejudice of the case may be presumed. See id. 
191 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 425, 440 (1996). 
192 Kirchmeier, supra note 191, at 441–44. 
193 Id. at 463. Kirchmeier proposes that ineffective assistance of counsel cases can be 
put on a continuum from the most to least egregious. See id. Kirchmeier argues that con-
flict of interest cases fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum and have a lower 
burden of proof. See id. at 464. 
194 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 343. In Cuyler, the defense attorney represented several co-
defendants charged for the same crime. See id. at 337–38. The defendant alleged ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s conflict of interest. See id. The major-
ity held that the defendant had the burden of objecting to the multiple representations to 
raise the issue on appeal. See id. at 346–47. Only once such an objection was brought to the 
court did the court have a duty to consider whether a conflict of interest existed. See id. 
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argued that if a court identifies a conflict of interest, it then has an af-
firmative duty to step in and apply a rebuttable presumption to the 
Strickland test.195 The conflict of interest in Cuyler involved multiple rep-
resentation, where defendants were charged with the same crime and 
represented by a single attorney.196 Justice Brennan quoted the major-
ity’s holding that a “possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of 
multiple representation” to conclude that upon discovery of joint rep-
resentation the court has an affirmative duty to ensure that the defen-
dant actually waived his constitutional right to counsel and understands 
the potential dangers of such waiver.197 As in earlier right-to-counsel 
cases, a court must presume that a defendant may not be aware of their 
rights or how to raise them.198 Justice Brennan argued that only when 
the record indicates that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent 
choice should the defendant have the burden of showing that the con-
flict affected the adequacy of representation.199 Otherwise, Justice 
Brennan advocated for a presumption that the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test is satisfied.200 The government, however, is still able to 
rebut the presumption by showing that the possibility of conflict did 
not actually affect the defendant’s representation.201
 Justice Brennan’s approach in Cuyler recognizes the difficulty of 
proving the prejudice prong when there is a conflict of interest.202 The 
Supreme Court, in the context of multiple representations, has con-
cluded that assessing the impact of conflict of interest in plea negotia-
tions is almost impossible.203 Plea negotiations are often informal dis-
cussions between the defense counsel and the prosecution.204 A 
defendant often may not understand what is appropriate under the 
                                                                                                                      
Thus, the majority in Cuyler did not recognize that a judge had an affirmative duty to inves-
tigate whether there was a conflict of interest; that burden rested with the defendant. See 
id. at 347–348. In dicta, the Court suggested that a lower standard should be applied to 
conflict of interest cases. See id. at 349–50; see also Kirchmeier, supra note 192, at 454 & 
n.135. 
195 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
196 See id. at 337 (majority opinion). 
197 See id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the majority). 
198 See id.; Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
199 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
200 See id. Several lower courts have applied the Court’s reasoning in Cuyler to a variety 
of conflict of interest cases other than multiple representations. See Kirchmeier, supra note 
191, at 453. 
201 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 353–54 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
202 See id. 
203 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1978). 
204 See Commonwealth v. Gaumond, No. 98–2813–14–15, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 n.2 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2002). 
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circumstances.205 Only a careful review of the record after the fact by an 
attorney who can understand the legal complexities may reveal the 
consequences of the counsel’s errors.206
 Likewise, plea negotiations in lobby conferences present an inher-
ent conflict of interest for the parties involved.207 The plea discussions 
are not merely between counsel, but take place off the record with the 
judge who will be trying the case if the settlement negotiations are not 
successful.208 Thus, a similar solution as the one articulated by Justice 
Brennan should be adopted in the context of lobby conferences.209 In 
Massachusetts, if the court identifies that an unrecorded lobby confer-
ence was held, it should make sure that the defendant properly waived 
his constitutional right when agreeing to an off the record lobby con-
ference.210 Unless a proper waiver is made on the record, the court 
must recognize a categorical presumption of prejudice for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.211 This would be a rebuttable presumption 
that the prosecution can overcome by showing the defendant has not 
been prejudiced in the lobby conference. 
Conclusion 
 Given the ever increasing stress on the courts’ resources, Massa-
chusetts district courts lobby cases in the name of efficiency. In a system 
stretched to capacity where defense counsel already have financial in-
centive to resolve cases as quickly as possible, the lack of record in these 
proceedings makes the ineffective assistance of counsel claim nothing 
more than a meaningless ritual for indigent defendants. By robbing 
indigent defendants of a procedural safeguard to hold their attorneys 
accountable, lobby conferences undermine the policy of procedural 
fairness and equity that has defined the right to counsel jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                      
205 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
206 See id. 
207 See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490–91; Backus & Marcus, supra note 23, at 1088–89. 
208 See Gaumond, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 n.2. 
209 Massachusetts adopted a version of Justice Brennan’s approach in Cuyler in conflict 
of interest cases. See Commonwealth v. Allison, 751 N.E.2d 868, 888 (Mass. 2001). Under 
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the courts presume the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland test satisfied if the defendant shows an actual conflict of interest, 
“detailing the precise character of the alleged conflict of interest.” See Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 384 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Mass. 1978). However, unlike Justice Brennan’s approach in 
Cuyler, the presumption of prejudice for the purposes of Article 12 analysis is not rebut-
table. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 353 (Brennan J., concurring); Davis 384 N.E.2d at 186. 
210 Cf. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 353 (Brennan J., concurring). 
211 Cf. id. 
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 Adopting a rebuttable presumption of prejudice in the context of 
lobby conferences will allow the district courts to maintain a practice 
they have been unwilling to abandon while, at the same time, meaning-
fully assess the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. By allocating the 
burden of plea bargaining in lobby conferences among all the parties, 
the categorical approach reinvigorates the policy of equity under the 
Sixth Amendment. 
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